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“Good games depend on good rules more than good players.” This slogan is an excellent 
encapsulation of the Public Choice tradition of economist James Buchanan. Public Choice 
eschews any theory of the ethical politician, choosing instead to focus on the importance of rules 
which economize on virtue, setting lower moral expectations for politicians. I argue when 
combined with Buchanan’s theory of becoming, the lowered expectations of Public Choice 
institutions imply a self-fulfilling prophecy: low expectations are set, and then met. This 
becomes a weakness for Public Choice only in light of a second observation: good rules 
sometimes depend upon good players. Public Choice lacks a theory of the ethical politician to 
address instances of in-period dilemmas between (a) an action which will further the politician’s 
self-interest and (b) an action which will protect some already accepted, good constitutional 
principle, but which does not further their self-interest. In response to this problem, I offer a 
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Introduction: The Problem of Low Expectations and the Principled Politician 
Good games depend on good rules more than good players.1 A wise adage, but 
incomplete: Good games depend on good rules more than good players--and good rules 
sometimes depend on good players. Certainly less catchy, but much closer to the mark. In the 
political game, we occasionally need politicians to do what is right even though it costs them. 
The Public Choice tradition advances a theory of “Politics without Romance” whereby public 
actors are assumed to be self-interested rather than virtuous and concerned with the public good. 
Championed by political economist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, the Public Choice 
tradition provides (1) a risk-averse normative theory of Constitutional Political Economy and (2) 
a theoretically unRomantic approach to the in-period behavior of public actors.2 Buchanan’s 
preferred constitutional arrangements may be plausible even when purely self-interested agents 
face constitutional choices under specific circumstances. However, constitutional conventions 
are not forthcoming in most countries, raising the question of relevance and robustness for Public 
Choice. Without a constitutional moment, unRomantic politicians are not left with the choice of 
which rules would be best, but with the question of what to do with the enforced rules and 
incentives already in place. If we hope to prevent the decay of good constitutions and promote 
the improvement of current constitutions, we need a theory of how politicians ought to act in-
 
1 Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1985, 167. 
 
2 Buchanan, James. 1986a. 
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period to defend or advance preferable constitutional principles. We need a theory of good 
players.  
Public Choice lacks a theory of what sort of politician would make our institutions more 
robust. It lacks an ethic of what character traits are demanded in the politician when tempted by 
self-interest to betray a constitutional principle. Consequently, it also lacks a theory of how such 
‘good’ politicians might be supplied. From within Buchanan’s corpus, I derive a theory of how 
politicians in ‘unRomantically’ designed institutions will likely not resemble what I call the 
Principled Politician and will instead resemble the self-interested Homo economicus.  
This is the Problem of Low Expectations: (1) by designing institutions which rightly 
economize on virtue, ‘good’ politicians are slowly crowded out or become more like Homo 
economicus. This is not a problem in itself, so long as the institutions remain intact. Limiting the 
amount of virtue necessary for political institutions is a worthy goal. However, formative low 
expectations become a problem when (2) politicians face in-period choices between pursuing 
their self-interest and protecting a constitutional principle which does not comport with their 
self-interest. Correctly solving such dilemmas requires politicians with constitutional 
commitment, something sorely lacking in agents who resemble Homo economicus. The health of 
even unRomantic institutions are threatened when these dilemmas are pervasive. An in-period, 
character-driven backstop is needed. 
In response to this problem I offer a theory of the Principled Politician. The theory is 
thin: it addresses just those situations where politicians must act against their self-interest in 
order to preserve the health of the constitution. Constitutional Political Economy attempts to 
design institutions to survive the presence of the self-interested Homo economicus. In that sense, 
such institutions are risk-averse: they limit the harm self-interested politicians can do. In 
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contrast, I theorize that the Principled Politician will be formed by institutions which handle risk 
differently by depending on individuals to act beyond their self-interest. Accordingly, institutions 
which form the Principled Politician will be open to greater risks of moral failure, but such 
failures will create lower social costs than crumbling political institutions. Preserving the risk-
averse impulse of Public Choice and creating opportunities for character development implies 
the following distribution of risk in character development: where moral failure has low social 
costs, we can allow ‘high expectations’ in institutional design; where moral failure has high 
social costs, we ought to apply ‘low expectations’ in institutional design.  These high 
expectations institutions will produce human beings capable of constitutional commitment, 
exhibiting both moral restraint and strategic courage.  
In section I, I outline the Public Choice approach and highlight the gap left for a theory of 
the Principled Politician. Section II provides the first part of the Problem of Low Expectations: 
Buchanan’s theory of ‘becoming’ should lead us to expect politicians under Public Choice 
institutions to lack moral restraint and increasingly resemble Homo economicus. Section III 
highlights the second part of the Problem of Low Expectations: repeated in-period dilemmas 
between constitutional principle and self-interest prevent constitutional improvement and lead to 
constitutional decay. Section IV provides a minimal theory of the Principled Politician. Section 
V argues for where and how we might expect the Principled Politician to be formed in a way that 










Section I. Why We Need a Theory of the Principled Politician 
The two branches of Public Choice perform interrelated but distinct work: (1) analyze the 
in-period behavior of political actors given a particular set of rules and (2) evaluate which rules 
are preferable. Public Choice does not Romanticize government or political actors as principled, 
efficient, and common good oriented, choosing instead to assume Homo economicus.34 Hence, 
“Politics without Romance.”5 Crucially, neither branch of Public Choice claims to need an 
ethical theory of the politician.  
In the empirical analysis, it is easy to see why. The positive branch of Public Choice 
unRomantically analyzes the in-period behavior of political actors given an already established 
set of rules.6 Politicians are assumed to be the self-interested Homo economicus: ambitious, 
interested in reelection, budget maximizing, and differentially interested in terms of their 
preferred policies and outcomes.7 While not wicked, Homo economicus will not simply ‘do the 
right thing’ because their conscience demands it. In part, these assumptions have proven useful 
 
3 Kogelmann, Brian. (2015) argues against Buchanan and Brennan’s usage of Homo economicus at length. As I later 
argue, the Homo economicus assumption is well-founded in some institutions. 
 
4 Kirchga ̈ssner, Gebhard 2014 discusses the role of Homo economicus in Buchanan’s thought at length. Much of 
what I discuss here is compatible if not similar.  
 
5 Buchanan, James M. 1979a. 
 
6 Ibid. 52-6. 
 




across Public Choice and much of the contemporary empirical political science literature because 
politicians often act in self-interested ways.8 
Almost from the beginning of Public Choice, critics have argued the unRomantic 
understanding of politics is immoral and degrades public-spirit.9 While Buchanan mentions a 
preference for ethical politicians, no theory of the Principled Politician appears for in-period 
play.10 Instead, Buchanan  responded to the ‘immorality objection’ by shifting perspective away 
from in-period incentives and toward constitutional choice. This shift in perspective, Buchanan 
argues, means immorality may be avoided without relying on good politicians. While normative 
and methodological reasons are given for the Homo economicus assumption in CPE, I focus on 
its purpose in CPE’s risk-averse normative goals.11  
CPE seeks institutional arrangements which economize on love and virtue, selecting rules 
which minimize the maximum amount of harm public actors can do were they to seek their self-
interest.12 CPE fears granting too much discretion to politicians, arguing that they will likely use 
that discretion to their own, rather than others’ advantage.13 Of course, this means if there are 
“well-intentioned and far-seeing” politicians, some CPE-preferred rules will prevent agents from 
 
8 E.g. Aldrich, John H. 2011; Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005; Rohde, David W. 1991; Mayhew, 
David R. 1974.  
 
9 Kelman, Steven. 1987.  
 
10 Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1988; Buchanan, James. M. 1983, 24;  Buchanan, J. M. 1979a, 59; Buchanan, 
J.M. ([1979b] 1999). 
 
11 See for example Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1985, “Modeling the Individual,” 53-75. See also Buchanan’s 
discussion of Moral Orders and Moral Community in Buchanan, J. M. 2001. Kirchgässner, G. (2014) also discusses 
this aspect of CPE.  
 
12 Buchanan, J. M. 1983. Buchanan sometimes refers to this as the minimax principle. See also Buchanan, James 
M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962, 287 
 
13 Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1985, 72-4 
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doing the most they could for the public.14 If discretion is limited, it limits both good and bad. In 
The Reason of Rules, Geoffrey Brennan and Buchanan summarize their use of Homo economicus 
by quoting David Hume: 
“In constraining any system of government and fixing the several checks and controls of the 
constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, 
than private interest.”15 
 
Whether by directing private interest to public good or by constraining discretion among 
politicians, the aim is to design rules which limit the “harm that governments can do, while 
preserving the range of beneficial governmental-collective activities.”16 The knavish, Homo 
economicus assumption of CPE is preferable to the extent that it leads to institutions which 
prevent more harm than good which they foreclose.17 There may be some other-regarding 
behavior in politics, but so far as we can, we ought to design constitutions to channel self-interest 
toward the general interest.  
Returning to the immorality objection, Buchanan argued that when Homo economicus (or 
a politician) analyzed which rules to choose they would arrive at fair constitutional 
arrangements. At the constitutional level, the choosing of rules, the trade-off for the individual 
chooser between their private good and the public interest is not as steep: if the rules under 
discussion are genuinely general, then even self-interested actors will choose fair rules because 
they cannot adequately determine whether an unfair rule will actually benefit them in the long 
run.18 As Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Geoffrey Brennan argue over several works, even 
 
14 Ibid. 60-62 
 
15 Ibid. 68 
 
16 Ibid. 167 
 
17 Ibid. 67 
 
18 Ibid. 165 
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Homo economicus may agree to generally applied laws, separation of powers, a 
supermajoritarian decision procedure, bicameral legislature, presidential veto, and a balanced 
budget amendment.19 
“Good games depend on good rules more than they depend on good players.”20 CPE aims 
to establish a stable constitution as part of an extended moral order, one which does not 
Romantically assume politicians will act altruistically. The argument, then, is that no ethical 
theory of the politician in-period is needed. If we want publicly minded politicians, we ought to 
change our constitution to eliminate particularity: get rid of laws which offer special treatment in 
any way and replace them with laws of generality.21 Even Homo economicus may arrive at such 
excellent rules if there is a constitutional moment. Neither branch of Public Choice claims to 
need an ethical theory of the politician. Unfortunately, even if we grant all of the above as 
uncontroversial, there are two reasons why Buchanan’s response to the aforementioned 
‘immorality objection’ is unsatisfactory. 
Perhaps most damaging to Public Choice, the relevance and robustness of CPE is 
severely limited because no constitutional moment seems to be forthcoming in contemporary 
societies. Rather than reflecting on constitutional reforms, politicians are stuck with the in-period 
perspective. This means that opportunities to improve our rules are foreclosed. Buchanan was 
pessimistic about our actual institutions, believing them to be fairly shot-through with 
particularity.22 Under these conditions, Buchanan acknowledged reforms were unlikely. With no 
 
 
19 Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962; Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1985 
20 Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1985, 167 
 
21 Buchanan, James M. 1993. 
 





constitutional convention on the horizon, we are stuck with the institutions we have. If very 
specific, and somewhat idealized, conditions must be met for CPE to produce good results 
among otherwise self-interested actors, then CPE is a rather frail approach to the project of real-
world constitutional reform.23 We need a theory which establishes a role for politicians to 
improve the health of our constitutions. 
Second, Public Choice does not adequately address the following situation for the 
politician: an in-period dilemma between (a) an action which will further their self-interest and 
(b) an action which will protect some already accepted, good constitutional principle, but which 
does not further their self-interest. If politicians are like Homo economicus, then opportunities to 
weaken a constitutional order will be difficult to avoid. In any instance where a constitutional 
principle is not enforced but ought to be followed, moral restraint is required of our politicians. If 
politicians lack moral restraint and resemble Homo economicus, we should expect in-period 
politicians to act against the constitutional principle and in favor of themselves. If vulnerable to 
this issue, one of CPE’s justifications will be undercut: Public Choice institutions will decay and 
allow for greater abuse of power. We need a theory which shows the role of politicians in 
preserving the health of constitutions. This second objection is, in a way, more pressing than the 
first: we need ethical politicians to help ‘stop the bleeding’ of constitutions before the more 
ambitious task of improving their health. 
Without a theory of what politicians are ethically preferable under Public Choice, both 
problems will remain difficult to overcome: constitutions will be (1) unlikely to improve, and (2) 
likely to weaken. As I show in Sections II and III, we should expect Public Choice institutions to 
 
23 For an example of these conditions, see Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962, 75. 
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exacerbate each of these problems. While I will develop the theory further in Sections IV and V, 
a preliminary view of the Principled Politician is appropriate.  
The defining characteristic of the Principled Politician is constitutional commitment: a 
lexically prior commitment to the constitution which orders the way they think, feel, and act. 
This means that the Principled Politician actually values the constitution and its institutions as 
something worth preserving, improving, and defending. The character of thinking, feeling, and 
acting in constitutional commitment is exhibited through two related capacities, moral restraint 
and strategic courage. Moral restraint is the ability to do what is right in the absence of enforced 
rules and often in the presence of temptations to do what is wrong. This facilitates the 
preservation of constitutions. The compliment to moral restraint is strategic courage: the ability 
to act in accordance with a rule which transcends in-period incentives and itself helps institute a 
new and better norm. Strategic courage helps improve constitutions. Both capacities require that 
the Principled Politician act on what is constitutionally right rather than what comports with their 
in-period self-interest. 
While moral restraint and strategic courage are applicable to any number of 
environments, they help make up constitutional commitment when combined with the lexical 
priority of the constitution’s health. Rather than demanding politicians act virtuously all the time, 
they need only act upon their constitutional commitment in certain situations. This allows a more 
realistic expectation: the Principled Politician may act in their self-interest so long as this 
lexically prior commitment is satisfied.  
Buchanan expressed a preference for non-Homo economicus public actors, but his 
unRomantic theory implies we ought to rely upon improved institutional arrangements, not upon 
better people. The good behavior of Homo economicus is dependent upon institutional restraints 
10 
 
(enforced rules) rather than constitutional commitment through moral restraint and strategic 
courage. As I have argued, this is unhelpful if imperfect rules are already in place and no 
constitutional convention is forthcoming. I turn now to how, by Buchanan’s own lights, we 
should expect politicians to become more like Homo economicus the longer they occupy our 
political institutions. In the absence of constitutional commitment, the Problem of Low 






















Section II: Becoming Homo economicus 
 In the vast majority of the Public Choice literature, agents are assumed to be static. If 
human beings do not change over time, then politicians will not dynamically become more like 
Homo economicus under any institutional arrangement. Buchanan referred to Public Choice as 
“Politics without Romance,” taking pride in the rejection of a Romantic view.  Despite 
Buchanan’s caveats, the theory of becoming in “Natural and Artifactual Man” is highly 
Romantic.24 In place of a static, self-interested actor, we find human beings possessed of 
something like Rousseauian perfectibility.  
It is worth noting just how strange and difficult this is for Buchanan to posit. The 
plasticity of human beings is one feature for which liberals typically criticize their illiberal 
competitors, Marx and Rousseau chief among them. Rousseau’s theory of decaying morals runs 
parallel to my own critique of Buchanan: without a need for virtue, politicians atrophy and 
resemble Homo economicus.25 For Rousseau the theorist must “take men as they are and laws as 
they might be.” Buchanan bears a striking resemblance to Rousseau in this respect.26 No matter 
what historical and institutional guardrails he erects in his defense, Buchanan experiments with a 
kind of limited Romance in his theory. Ironically, Buchanan’s hopeful theory of becoming shows 
 
24 Buchanan, J.M. ([1979b] 1999), 252. 
 
25 For Rousseau, it is the citizens who atrophy. That argument mirrors Bruno Frey’s critique of public choice. Frey, 
Bruno S. 1997. 
 
26 And, I think, in many others. Another inquiry might show that Buchanan shares, of course, a great deal with John 
Locke and Adam Smith, but also on Rousseau. The resemblance between Rousseau’s general will and Buchanan’s 
generality principle is one example. 
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how Public Choice institutions will, other things being equal, result in agents who resemble 
Homo economicus.  
 Buchanan’s work on becoming is in service of a hopeful slogan: Man wants liberty to 
become the man he wants to become.27 This slogan points directly to the problem at hand.  There 
is a connection between who we are able to become and the rules by which we are bound.28 In 
Buchanan’s view, human beings uniquely possess the capacity for “becoming.” Humans know 
we can, “within limits, shape the form of being that we shall be between now and the time of 
death, even when we fully reckon on the stochastic pattern of life expectancy.”29 Human beings 
are more than merely natural, they are artifactual: a product of their own imagination, direct, 
effort, and their (sometimes) chosen institutions.30 
 While humans may imagine themselves becoming anything, our options are constrained 
by a number of factors. Beyond purely natural constraints, there are (1) nonartifactual and (2) 
artifactual constraints. Buchanan calls spontaneously ordered constraints ‘nonartifactual:’ the 
result of human action, and so not natural, but also not the result of human design, and so not 
artifactual.31 These nonartifactual constraints are our evolved rules of conduct and culture. 
Institutions may drift and decay, driving negative impacts on becoming.32  
 Complexly, to the extent that rules of conduct, culture, and our institutions are the result 
of choice and continual adherence on the part of the individual, then those rules may be 
 
27  Ibid. 259 [Emphasis in original.] 
 
28 See Aligica, P. D. 2018, for a discussion of Buchanan and Ostroms correspondence. 
 
29Buchanan, J.M. ([1979b] 1999), 247. 
 
30 Ostrom, Vincent. 2000. See especially “Toward a science of citizenship in democratic systems of order.” 
 
31 Buchanan acknowledges Hayek on spontaneous orders in this section. Ibid. 247 
 
32 Buchanan, James M. 1975, 340-5 
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artifactual--and so play an intentional role in the process of becoming.33 Just as an individual’s 
choices of becoming matter to who she becomes, how we choose to live, govern, worship, and 
work together is essential to becoming. An individual may unilaterally choose to invest in some 
forms of becoming, but these will always be subject to natural, nonartifactual, and artifactual 
constraints. Alternatively, which institutional arrangements are viable will depend on who, or 
what, the individuals within them choose to become: there is a connection between the private 
constitution of individuals (their moral character), and the public constitution of human beings, 
the character of society.34 This connection has led some commenters to emphasize the 
constructivism of Buchanan and its connection to becoming as an alternative conception of the 
human being: Homo Constitutionalus.35 
Finally, Buchanan views human beings as rule bound, not rule determined.36 It matters 
what human beings decide to become within the bounds of their institutional context. They may 
do better or worse, morally speaking. While there is no room for angels, there may be room for 
our Principled Politician. To flip Machiavelli, politicians may learn “how not to be bad.”  
Several implications from the theory of becoming are useful in stating the Problem of 
Low Expectations. Take a simple example from Buchanan: Jones, who hopes to quit smoking. 
First, Jones’s imaging himself as a non-smoker presents an epistemic challenge. When Jones 
decides whether to quit smoking at some time t, his calculation of the costs of doing so depend 
 
33  Buchanan, J.M. ([1979b] 1999), 247. This account of institutions is what distinguishes the Austrian School 
(Hayek) from Virginia (Buchanan) and Bloomington (Ostrom): Ostrom and Buchanan leave more room for 
intentional institutional building; institutions are artifacts rather than merely evolved. 
 
34 Ibid, 252 
 
35 Congleton, Roger. 2018; Aligica, P. D. 2018. 
 
36 Congleton, Roger. 2018. 
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on his utility function at t. However, if he is successful and his utility function has changed by 
time t+1, then his reckoning of the costs to quit smoking differ across time.  
 If people really can change at a deep level, then they do not have well-defined 
preferences.37 Our choices make us and we make our choices. This process occurs at each 
choice, but its effects may accumulate over a lengthy period; we cannot radically change 
ourselves in a moment.38 Becoming means that Jones may have the ability to choose rationally in 
a particular moment, but he will have less clarity when choosing over time: what Jones counts as 
valuable, what he enjoys, and what he is able to do may change. If becoming is a real human 
faculty, it implies we may forgo short term gains in favor of hard-to-calculate investments in 
becoming.39This also means that who we are at time t does not determine who we can become at 
time t+1: there is room for human freedom in becoming.  
A lack of well-defined preferences does not make decisions about becoming completely 
unworkable. If Jones buys a membership at the local art museum, his decision whether to 
become a greater lover of art or become an excellent chess player is subject to differences in 
opportunity cost relative to joining the art museum. Even if Jones can’t exactly engage in 
economic means-ends calculus, he can still understand how one investment in becoming will 
connect with his other choices.  
 Second, Jones may place himself under a rule, an artifactual constraint, which assists in 
his goal of becoming a non-smoker. Jones may simply attempt, through will-power, to resist 
temptation. Or, he may leave his cigarettes at home or contract a coercive rule with a third party 
 
37 Buchanan, J.M. ([1979b] 1999), 253. 
 
38 Ibid. 257. 
 
39 Ibid. 253-4. 
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enforcer. While Jones will often choose to maximize his utility at any given moment, his utility 
calculus is subject to constraints: if he is punished, smoking may not be ‘worth it.’ Given 
changes in preference, Jones comes to evaluate the act of smoking differently and smoking is no 
longer attractive, even without the constraints. Jones eventually just becomes the sort of person 
who does not want to smoke. Buchanan notes the following: 
“Almost the same analysis can be applied to any aspect of human behavior that represents 
“civility” in the larger meaning of the term. I refer here inclusively to manners, etiquette, codes of 
conduct, standards of decorum, and, most important, morals.”40 
 
Buchanan’s theory of becoming fits nicely with a broad understanding of virtue and character 
development. The development of character and virtue are usually divided into three categories: 
thinking, feeling, and acting. If Jones is successful and quits smoking, he will have become a 
different person in all three respects. Jones will (a) think differently about smoking, (b) have 
different motivations or desires with respect to smoking, and (c) he will act differently (he won’t 
smoke). While Jones may initially only refrain from smoking when he is punished or fined for 
doing so, his intention is to become someone whose desires have changed. If successful, who 
Jones is has changed as a result of his efforts, meaning that he may exercise moral restraint and 
resist the temptation to smoke even in the absence of constraints. Especially for the purpose of 
showing how the Principled Politician may be supplied, Buchanan’s theory is rather hopeful: it 
explains how personal commitment and institutions (artifacts) allow us to improve. But if human 
beings change, they may change for the worse.  
In light of this, we must ask: are Public Choice institutions desirable? Buchanan responds 
in the following way:  
“It is essential that it be understood that those characteristics which are “desirable” in the behavior 
of a person or persons are wholly independent of those characteristics that are “desirable” in an 
 
40 Ibid. 253. 
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institutional structure.”41  
 
If the theory of becoming is accepted, the two are not so easily separable: institutions shape who 
we become, our abilities, our preferences. It is unhelpful to simply state that evaluative standards 
of institutions and individuals differ while maintaining their outcomes are interrelated. We may 
accept that Public Choice is desirable, but we must also count the cost of that success in terms of 
becoming. In later works, Buchanan seems more aware of this possibility:  
Each political actor, regardless of his role, combines both of these elements [self-interest and 
general interest] in his behavior pattern, along with many other elements not noted here. The 
whole point of constitutional inquiry is the proposition that the constraints, rules and institutions 
within which persons make choices politically can and do influence the relative importance of the 
separate motivational elements.42 
 
So, there is a tension to investigate: we must design political institutions to economize on virtue, 
acknowledging this approach may emphasize self-interest relative to other motivational elements 
like constitutional commitment. 
Recall that what makes the Principled Politician important is their ability to defend or 
promote a desirable constitutional principle even when it is not in their self-interest. It is easy to 
make an argument that Public Choice institutions, which ‘economize’ virtue, will lead to agents 
lacking in the ability to preserve or improve a constitution if it disagrees with their in-period self-
interest. In fact, Buchanan and Tullock almost say exactly that at the end of the landmark 
Calculus of Consent:  
“Moreover, insofar as this attitude [of placing general over self-interest] exists, somewhat fewer 
constitutional constraints on the operation of ordinary rules for collective choice may be dictated 
than would otherwise be indicated as rational. It should be stressed that moral restraint is a 
substitute for institutional-constitutional constraint, and in a society with more of the former there 
will be less need for the latter, and vice versa.”43 
 
41 Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962, 285-6 
 
42 Buchanan, James. 1986b, 11-2 
 




Where an enforced rule restrains behavior, the need for the virtue of moral restraint is lessened. 
This fact is nearly the core of why CPE exists: design rules so that when a politician acts in their 
self-interest they also happen to do what is right. A simple argument may be made that these 
rules will not only lessen the need for moral restraint, but also lessen their presence as well.  
 (1) All becoming beyond what is merely natural is subject to both short term and long-
term opportunity costs. Even if costs in (1) are difficult to calculate, (2) one’s institutional 
environment incentivizes some skills over others. (3) Moral restraint and strategic courage are 
costly-to-attain personal attributes. If (1), (2), and (3) are true, then (4) in an environment where 
moral restraint and strategic courage are not often needed, agents will have pro tanto reason to 
invest in some other capacity. This means that politicians in Public Choice institutions, with only 
this perspective, lack much reason to maintain or develop the virtues necessary for constitutional 
commitment. If politicians individually see the value of defending the constitution, this may 
provide a counterbalance to the argument I have just posed. Institutions do not determine 
character; there may be some space for the Principled Politician. But the problem of becoming 
Homo economicus still needs to be spelled out. 
Jones may see how becoming a greater lover of art makes more sense than playing chess 
because he has joined the art museum. Buchanan makes much the same argument about welfare 
benefits: where welfare benefits are too high, the recipient has little incentive to find work and 
develop an ethic of responsibility.44 Similarly, the politician’s institutional environment increases 
the costs of moral restraint and highlights the advantages of becoming more like Homo 
economicus.  
 




Consider how competitive elections increase the presence of politicians who increasingly 
resemble Homo economicus. Competitive elections have the effect of both (1) crowding out 
moral restraint and (2) incentivizing politicians to become more like Homo economicus.45 The 
arrangements I describe in competitive elections, including parties, are hardly ideal, perhaps 
even by Public Choice standards. Buchanan argued that in the absence of nonelectoral 
constraints, elections were insufficient to prevent abuses of power.46  
First, the argument below proceeds even if nonelectoral constraints are in place (e.g. 
politicians may not use campaign donations to pay for vacation homes). Second, the charge is 
not that ideally implemented CPE institutions are subject to the Problem of Low Expectations. I 
argue instead, lacking a ‘constitutional moment’, actual, imperfect political arrangements will 
move away from ideal constitutional principles if politicians resemble Homo economicus. The 
trouble then, is that Public Choice institutions in some ways facilitate rather than ameliorate a 
particular kind of decay by making it more likely for politicians to resemble Homo economicus. 
In what follows, I describe what occurs if politicians attempt to operate without constitutional 
commitment.  
First, take crowding out. As Brian Kogelmann rightly argues, Buchanan and Brennan 
over-apply the crowding out argument in favor of the Homo economicus assumption.47 Different 
institutions will induce different behaviors amongst all actors in response to the self-interested 
behavior of only a few actors. Unfortunately, because there are a limited number of highly valued 
 
45 I focus here on moral restraint, but similar arguments may be made to show why strategic courage is even more 
‘expensive’ than moral restraint in this environment. 
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positions without marginality, elected politics will often result in all elected politicians behaving 
like Homo economicus.48 The presence of Homo economicus in such an environment “raises the 
cost” of non-self-interested behavior differently than the market.49 A business which has merely 
self-interested competitors may retain other-regarding values because they are not in a ‘winner-
take-all’ environment: their gains and losses are one-by-one, at the margin. While a business may 
receive fewer customers than its competitor and still stay open, the politician is eliminated. 
Hence, the cost of non-self-interested behavior for the politician is much higher. If one’s 
competitor behaves like Homo economicus, it will produce similarly self-interested behavior in 
all candidates or those candidates will face an increased likelihood of defeat and replacement. 
Both crowding out and becoming are clearer in context. Consider the institutional life of 
some elected politician, Jordan. Jordan holds office in a competitive electoral district and must 
run for reelection every two years. Given the dynamic described above, Jordan must be highly 
effective in seeking their self-interest in order to retain their seat. Jordan will assess opportunities 
for fundraising, committee appointments, policy positions, and roll-call votes. There are few, if 
any, enforceable rules which cause Jordan to directly consider what is best for the country or 
institutional health. Instead, Jordan’s feedback mechanisms are linked to their chance of 
reelection. If any other concern arises, it arises after the question of reelection. Ideally, concern 
for reelection will drive Jordan to do things which are both in their self-interest and in the 
interest of the country and their institutions. However, because Jordan’s job depends on making 
the most of their opportunities to defeat a merely self-interested challenger, it makes sense for 
 
48 This assumes single member, winner-take-all elections rather than proportional, party ballot elections. 
  
49 “Non-self-interested” is admittedly a rather awkward construction. But, it accurately describes what is at issue. It 
is not just altruistic behavior which is crowded out, but also malicious behavior which does not align with one’s self-
interest as defined by the institutional setting. 
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them to ask of any particular action “how should I act to improve my chance of reelection?” 
rather than “what would be best for the country or best to protect our institutions?” 
Becoming is deeply connected with one’s institutional context. Jones’s thinking, 
motivations, and actions changed as a result of efforts to quit smoking. In the absence of 
constitutional commitment, we can expect that Jordan’s thinking, motivations, and actions will 
be shaped by the pressures of the institution. The dynamic of crowding out means we can expect 
Jordan’s actions to change as a rational response to the self-interested behavior of other 
politicians. As a result, Jordan will act to make the most of opportunities and improve their 
chances of reelection.  
Jordan’s internal being will also change. First, Jordan will think primarily in terms of 
how an action will suit their self-interest as it relates to the goal of reelection. Of course, Jordan 
may have other goals (e.g. policy) but these often become subordinated to the goal of reelection. 
What counts as the primary reason for acting in this environment is not “is this good?” or “does 
it defend constitutional principles” but “does this improve my reelection prospects, or at least not 
harm them?” Jordan becomes the sort of person who thinks of their political life in terms of self-
interest, rather than the general interest or the health of the constitution.  
Second, Jordan’s institutional environment influences their motivations and desires. 
Recall that Jones may be coerced by some institutional mechanism to quit smoking. Over time, 
even in the absence of constraints, Jones’ preference for smoking has changed and his ability to 
resist temptation is increased. In place of institutional restraint, Jones has a kind of personally 
useful moral constraint. Granted, if operating under institutions which obey Buchanan’s desired 
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generality principle, then perhaps Jordan would grow to seek the general interest even in the 
absence of institutional restraints. But, as Buchanan points out, we are not in such a situation.50  
There are many particularities which train Jordan away from general interest and toward 
special interests. Rather than leading politicians to love the constitution or the general interest, 
competitive elections often provide incentives for politicians to reliably seek their self-interest in 
ways which do not necessarily connect to loftier goals. Constituents are partial to their own 
interests, and lobbyists, special interests, and political action committees are, almost by 
definition, not concerned with the general interest. Political parties often structure institutional 
incentives for their own success and control of politicians. Jordan is not becoming someone 
especially admirable, but someone who thinks, feels, and acts in their own self-interest.  
Jordan is not destined or determined by their context to become more like Homo 
economicus. However, without constitutional commitment, politicians are merely shaped by 
unRomantic institutional constraints which make moral restraint costly. If Jordan lacks an 
independent commitment to the constitution, they will likely be swept up in the rat-race of 
political competition. This is only the first part of the Problem of Low Expectations: politicians 
under Public Choice institutions will become more like Homo economicus. But all this amounts 
to very little if such politicians do not actually present a problem for constitutional health. Jordan 
may become more and more like Homo economicus, but if that presents no real threat to our 
institutions, then Constitutional Political Economy is a success. I now turn to the second part of 
the problem: that such politicians are faced with repeated in-period dilemmas between 
constitutional principle and self-interest, preventing constitutional improvement and leading to 
constitutional decay. 
 





Section III: Politicians and In-Period Dilemmas 
If politicians lack the moral restraint or strategic courage necessary to act in favor of the 
constitution rather than their self-interest, there will be real costs. In this section I draw on 
democratic backsliding literature to generate a clear hypothetical demonstrating the sort of 
failure to which Public Choice is vulnerable: in-period dilemmas between self-interest and 
constitutional commitment.51A real-world example follows the hypothetical. As Nancy Bermeo 
points out, many politicians’ backsliding strategies are rational responses to incentives; 
backsliding is often in their self-interest.52 While Bermeo’s examples come from Turkey and 
Ecuador, the United States is not exceptional: in the absence of institutional restraints, self-
interested politicians act against constitutional health and for themselves. Owing to the fact of 
political judgment, I grant that even readers who agree on the hypothetical may disagree as to 
whether my real-world example is actually a failure. I supply some needed responses and 
transition to the theory of the Principled Politician. 
One goal of Constitutional Political Economy is limiting the discretion of politicians. By 
reducing discretion, CPE reduces the risks associated with the misuse of state power.  
Federalism, checks-and-balances, and the separation of powers are integral to this task, often 
through limitations on the use of funds and the power to tax. While there are instances where 
granting power is legitimate, Buchanan and Brennan argue that those who most desire greater 
 
51 Bermeo, Nancy. 2016.  
 
52 Ibid. 15. 
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discretionary power are those who wish to wield it, not for the benefit of others, but for 
themselves.53 Only a theorist who actually believes that despots are benevolent would eliminate 
restraints on executive power.54 An institutional change allowing politicians (or one politician) 
greater discretionary power has failed a significant criterion of CPE. CPE’s dislike for 
discretionary power sits in uncomfortable alignment with a trend in democratic backsliding 
toward executive aggrandizement.55  
Consider the politics of Jederland.56 After an economic downturn and concerns over 
national security, Sarah Strong is elected President of Jederland. Lacking constitutional 
commitment, Pres. Strong aims to position her party (the SP) for success in future elections by 
increasing her own power and electoral prospects. Jordan, from section II, holds elected office in 
Jederland’s national legislature and is a member of the SP. 
Rather than conducting a coup, Strong decides to push for incremental changes to policy 
and the constitution by enlarging the scope of executive discretionary spending through 
increased emergency powers. Strong’s efforts are bolstered through court-packing and lower 
protections for an independent press. These changes are conducted through legitimate channels 
which depend on the cooperation of politicians like Jordan, but strike against the constitutional 
principle of limiting discretionary power. Following the backsliding literature, Pres. Strong and 
members of the SP enjoy democratic support for their actions and are set to increase their control 
in the next election. 
 
53 Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1985, 72-3. 
 
54 Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. 1980, 211. 
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Ideally, Jordan and other members of the legislature and judiciary would slow or even 
reverse executive aggrandizement. Of course, members of the opposition challenge Strong 
because it is in their self-interest to do so: their party, constituents, and donors disagree with 
Strong and her agenda. But the opposition is in the minority. Protecting the constitution depends 
on action from within Strong’s party. For each incremental move toward aggrandizement, Jordan 
and other SP legislators could check overreach on constitutional grounds. However, Strong’s 
popularity and political prowess mean that anyone willing to do so will face poorer reelection 
prospects. For members of the SP, opposing Strong means choosing between protecting one’s 
job and protecting the constitution. 
Each time members of the SP are asked to go along with President Strong’s goals, they 
face an in-period dilemma: act in their own self-interest (and with Strong) or act to protect the 
constitution and face electoral backlash and party retribution? If, like Jordan, politicians have 
become more like Homo economicus as a result of their institutional environment, then they will 
be more likely to side with Strong rather than the constitution. The events in Jederland are a clear 
failure by CPE’s own lights. In-period dilemmas between self-interest and the constitution have 
resulted in repeated, incremental increases in discretionary power for the executive. Complexly, 
executive aggrandizement enjoys democratic support. This means that in order to protect the 
constitution, members of the SP will have to act against their self-interest and, at least in the 
short-term perspective, against democratic wishes. The need for constitutional commitment in 
opposition to Pres. Strong is evident: politicians like Jordan need to exhibit moral restraint in 
order to slow or stop executive aggrandizement. 
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 As events in Turkey, Ecuador, and Poland show, the hypothetical is not far-fetched.57 
However, consider a controversial and real-world case from the United States. On February 25, 
2019, US Republican Senator Thom Tillis wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post.58 In the op-ed, 
Sen. Tillis explained that while he agreed with Republican President Donald Trump’s goal of 
securing the border with Mexico, declaring an emergency in order to achieve that end would be 
inappropriate. Sen. Tillis objected to the use of emergency powers by the President because of 
his interest reflecting the separation of powers embodied in the US Constitution:  
“It is my responsibility to be a steward of the Article I branch, to preserve the separation of powers 
and to curb the kind of executive overreach that Congress has allowed to fester for the better part 
of the past century. I stood by that principle during the Obama administration, and I stand by it 
now.” 
 
Ideally, that would be the end of the story. Sen. Tillis had a principled commitment to the 
constitution and would not grant an exception in his own case: “acceptable for my party but not 
thy party” was something he could not stomach. This is exactly the sort of principle Jordan 
needed to check the expansion of discretionary power to protect the overall health of a 
constitution. 
Unfortunately, the story does not end there. When it became clear his constituents did not 
support his stance against the President, Sen. Tillis sought a compromise, then completely 
flipped his position and voted in support of President Trump on March 14, 2019.59 Fortunately, a 
number of other actors moved against the President’s attempt to increase discretionary power.60  
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 First, since executive overreach was prevented, doesn’t the example show that Public 
Choice institutions are a success? Not exactly. CPE views increases in discretionary power as 
dangerous, and supporting President Trump’s use of emergency powers to build a wall on the 
Mexican border is a clear instance of this, even by Sen. Tillis’s own lights. Sen. Tillis 
demonstrates the Problem of Low Expectations by choosing self-interest over constitutional 
commitment. When presented with the perfect opportunity to exhibit moral restraint and defend 
the constitution in the absence of constraints, Sen. Tillis acted in his self-interest instead. Public 
Choice lacks a theory of the ethical politician and so is virtually silent with respect to what 
politicians should do in the hypothetical or real-world cases above.  
While institutional arrangements and self-interest happened to align to stop executive 
overreach in this instance, there is no guarantee that self-interest will always conveniently align 
with constitutional principle. The Tillis example demonstrates that there are real-world, in-period 
conflicts between self-interest and constitutional commitment which politicians resolve in favor 
of themselves. As in the hypothetical, if these occur on a large enough scale, institutional 
solutions will fail. An agential backstop is needed; that the United States does not already face 
constitutional failure is no reason to reject the project of the Principled Politician.   
 Second, isn’t Sen. Tillis’s choice a function of his commitment to representing his 
constituents rather than self-interest? As the backsliding literature argues, actions which undercut 
the constitution often enjoy democratic support.61 This is part of the issue. It was in Sen. Tillis’s 
self-interest to support the president because that action would translate into better electoral 
outcomes. Finally, since Sen. Tillis initially mentioned his commitment to the constitution, 
doesn’t this example show that constitutional commitment will be overcome by self-interest? 
 
61  Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. 
27 
 
While that is what occurred in this case, self-interest need not always overcome constitutional 
commitment. As I show in the next section, there is reason to be hopeful.  
 Political decision-making is complex. Moreover, human beings are complex. It would be 
easy to criticize Sen. Tillis for acting like Homo economicus when what was needed was a 
person of principle. Just as Buchanan thought, politicians are not merely self-interested or 
principled. Instead, they face complex moral questions and are themselves a mix of good and 
bad, self-interested and altruistic.62 The Problem of Low Expectations is that politicians will 
become more likely to choose their self-interest rather than exercising moral restraint the longer 
they operate within unRomantic Public Choice institutions. Politicians are people, not mere 
models of people. In reality, politicians will engage in a mix of self-interested and other-
regarding behavior, they will variously exhibit self-interest and moral restraint. The theory I 
offer of the Principled Politician is an attempt show how self-interest and constitutional 
















Section IV: The Principled Politician 
 Following Public Choice, good games do depend more on good rules than on good 
players. But, in particular instances, good rules depend on good players. The aim is to provide a 
theory of the Principled Politician which goes no further than meeting the needs of those 
particular instances where good players are needed for good rules: our theory ought to remain as 
unRomantic as possible. In light of this, more demanding theories which emphasize the 
relationship between the politicians and constituents or between politicians themselves will be 
compatible with my account, so long as they comport with constitutional commitment.63  
Within broad limits of toleration, Buchanan thought we ought to prefer a career politician 
who is committed to their own conception of the general interest to a power-seeker or a “time-
serving drone who minimizes effort.”64 We want politicians with good intentions, but no one too 
preachy.65 This section provides an understanding of the Principled Politician which helps solve 
the Problem of Low Expectations without introducing problems that Buchanan associated with 
perfectionistic Zealots.  Neither a moral perfectionist nor a merely self-interested knave, the 
Principled Politician is, in many respects, more like a real person. However, unlike most people, 
the capacities needed for constitutional commitment, moral restraint and strategic courage, must 
be strong in order to solve the Problem of Low Expectations.  
 
63 E.g. Celis, Karen, and Sarah Childs. 2018; Sabl, Andrew. 2002; Dovi, Suzanne. 2007; Muirhead, Russell. 2014. 
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The Principled Politician is characterized by constitutional commitment: a lexically prior 
commitment to the constitution which orders the way they think, feel, and act. This commitment 
is enabled by the dual capacities of moral restraint and strategic courage. Moral restraint is the 
capacity to do what is right in the absence of enforced rules. This facilitates the preservation of 
constitutions. The compliment to moral restraint is strategic courage: the ability to act in 
accordance with a rule which transcends in-period incentives and itself helps institute a new and 
better norm. Strategic courage helps improve constitutions. Both capacities require that the 
Principled Politician act on what is constitutionally right rather than what comports with their in-
period self-interest. 
Consider some person named Frieda. Frieda has a lexically prior commitment to fair-play 
which informs the way she thinks, feels, and acts while playing a game or engaging in a group 
activity. Imagine Frieda is playing a game and happens to see some of the cards in her 
competitor’s hand. Frieda realizes this is an unfair advantage which undercuts the goal of fair-
play. Frieda acts on her commitment, requesting a redeal. She is able to identify this situation 
because she understands what fair-play in the context of the game is (thinking), she values it 
(feeling/motivation), and she has the capacity to act on her commitment. No one knows she saw 
the cards, and there is no enforcement mechanism beyond embarrassment or shame if she is 
caught. By requesting a redeal, Frieda does something contrary to her own in-period self-interest 
in order to preserve a norm of fair-play. In this case, her commitment to fair-play was enabled by 
her ability to exhibit moral restraint.  
Notice that if no violation of fair-play arises, Frieda retains her commitment, but has no 
requirement to exercise it; commitment to fair-play is constant, but need not be acted upon all the 
time. Crucially, Frieda’s commitment is perfectly consistent with her desire to win the game. She 
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need not exercise moral restraint to allow others to win instead of herself. Frieda’s commitment 
helps preserve good, though basically unenforceable rules which protect a general interest (a fair 
game). Finally, Frieda must remain watchful of her own thinking and motivations. If she begins 
to value winning over fair-play, she must find a way to remain committed. While constitutions 
are more complex than tabletop games, and the stakes are much higher, the game example is 
illustrative: it shows us how constitutional commitment works.  
Now let us assume Frieda is a US Senator. In the constitutional context, the Zealot may 
aim to alter the constitution to achieve their perfectionistic end in violation of constitutional 
norms. Alternatively, Homo economicus does not, in-period, ‘count’ unenforced norms as 
valuable and thinks only in terms of their self-interest. Unlike either Homo economicus or the 
Zealot, Frieda has internalized a lexically prior commitment to the Constitution. Consider the 
Oath of Office which all Senators take: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; 
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I 
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter: So help me 
God.66 
 
Interpreting the Oath of Office as a formal statement of constitutional commitment means that 
Frieda avoids the worst of Homo economicus and the Zealot. Frieda has knowledge of the 
constitution, positively values it, and can act on her commitment if the occasion calls for it. 
Where constitutional commitment is satisfied, Frieda may fulfill her commitment to constituents, 
keep promises, serve her self-interest, flip-flop (or ‘evolve’ on an issue), work toward higher 
office, and compromise so long as it does not conflict with her constitutional commitment.  
 
66 United States Senate. n.d. “Oath of Office.”  
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In other words, Frieda is much like other politicians in that she will seek her self interest, 
but unlike Homo economicus in that she will only do so if it does not conflict with her prior 
commitment to protect the Constitution. This balance lowers the threat of crowding out--
constitutional commitment does not require that the Principled Politician let others win. Frieda’s 
constitutional commitment serves as a backstop: it helps defend the health of the constitution. 
When presented with an in-period dilemma between the constitution and her self-interest, Frieda 
honors her constitutional commitment. The Principled Politician is one who, in-period, will be 
able to act on a lexically prior commitment to the health of the institution, allowing her to defend 
already good constitutional principles through moral restraint.  
More ambitiously, the Principled Politician will also pursue constitutional improvements 
through strategic courage.67 Similar to Frieda’s constitutional commitment, strategic courage 
means that Frieda overcomes self-interest in order to seek a constitutional or governmental 
improvement. The Principled Politician is willing to take risks to provide a good which others 
will enjoy, but which no person has reason to pursue themselves.  
Illustrating strategic courage is easier in the context of politics. In her capacity as US 
Senator, Frieda notices a problem with potentially high social costs: insider trading in Congress. 
While the STOCK Act already limits some trading by elected officials, several suspicious trades 
occured in advance of market-tumbling COVID-19 news.68 Frieda knows that active investing is 
the norm amongst elected officials but can see that such investments can undercut public 
confidence in government and create perverse incentives for her and her colleagues. No one 
member of Congress has reason to pursue a change to this law, even though all appear less 
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trustworthy because of it. In light of this, Frieda acts to establish a new norm by liquidating all 
her individual equities, reinvesting her money in mutual funds. Frieda will benefit if the market 
performs well. But Frieda, nor anyone investing money on her behalf, can pick ‘winners and 
losers’ in the same way as individual equities.69  
Frieda announces this move at the same time she introduces legislation to require elected 
officials to do the same. In this sense, Frieda is not a generic do-gooder. Instead, Frieda is aware 
that present norms give politicians too much opportunity to serve themselves without also 
serving the general interest. Frieda courageously acts to establish a new rule which eliminates or 
ameliorates that social cost. Her action puts moral pressure on other representatives and draws 
public attention to the issue. It may turn out that exercising strategic courage is a net-gain for 
Frieda--be she did not know how it would turn out when she first acted. 
Strategic courage does not require the Principled Politician to go about solving every 
minor social ill. The need for strategic courage comes when an institutional arrangement would 
otherwise ‘trap’ self-interested actors if not for someone willing to act against their self-interest 
with the aim of instituting a new and better arrangement. Strategic courage is institutionally 
geared because the act of courage aims to establish a new norm which eliminates the need for 
others to do the same in the future. Once Frieda’s law is passed, other members will be simply 
following the rules. 
These cases illustrate what the Principled Politician is like and how demanding 
constitutional commitment is. Constitutional commitment is needed when there is an in-period 
dilemma between the health of the constitution and the politician’s self-interest. This makes 
other-regarding behavior conditional. If the lexical priority of constitutional commitment is 
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satisfied because the relevant options for action do not include those which undercut the 
constitution, neither the capacity of moral restraint or strategic courage is required. In the context 
of our political institutions, these capacities are a scarce good. Because the social costs of failing 
constitutional commitment are high in political institutions, we should design institutions which 
follow the Public Choice approach. But, because these instances occur, the Principled Politician 
is sometimes needed: good rules sometimes need good players.  
A minimal theory of the Principled Politician means defending the constitution is 
weighted more heavily than improving the constitution. There are several reasons for this 
differential weighting. The first reason is commonsensical if we consider the analogy to bodily 
health: one should ‘stop the bleeding’ before going on a diet. Too, keeping the status quo is less 
‘expensive’ than advancing new solutions, however desirable they may be. Second, moral 
restraint is less demanding than strategic courage. It is simply more demanding to strike out and 
attempt to institute a new rule. Finally, while the theory I offer is minimal, it may still be morally 
demanding for the Principled Politician to exercise moral restraint and strategic courage. As I 
once heard a scholar of American politics quip: “there is a reason Profiles in Courage is so 
short…” Putting the constitution above one’s self-interest is difficult. I have outlined a theory of 
why we need the Principled Politician. I turn now to how and where we might expect individuals 










Section V: Becoming the Principled Politician 
 Public Choice institutions are a good environment for becoming more like Homo 
economicus, but occasionally require agents markedly unlike Homo economicus to remain 
healthy. This section provides a theory of how, or where, the crucial capabilities of the Principled 
Politician may be developed. First, Buchanan’s theory of becoming is compatible with multiple 
approaches to virtue and character development. If we understand moral restraint and strategic 
courage as institutionally situated virtues, how they are developed and sustained becomes clear. 
Second, situating the development of these virtues in an institutional context reveals the risks 
associated with becoming. These risks are a steep price to pay for character development, but are 
conceptually impossible to eliminate. Third, the location of these risks in becoming matches the 
commitments of Public Choice. However, the risks of becoming also suggest the need for exit 
rights and oversight of these institutions. Individuals must have an opportunity to leave the risky 
institutions of becoming, and there must be some assurance that these locations do not become 
sites of vice instead of virtue. 
Section V-A: Developing Moral Restraint and Strategic Courage 
 If we take the human being to be Homo Constitutionalus, then becoming is tightly related 
to one’s institutional environment but requires individual commitment: our institutions influence, 
but do not determine, who we become.  Buchanan’s approach to the theory of becoming is 
compatible with multiple other approaches in the same vein. 
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Jane Mansbridge points out the need for an ‘ecological niche’ for altruistic behavior. The 
idea in Mansbridge’s account is that institutions can actually allow for a mix of self-interest and 
altruism. This means that those who participate in institutions need not ‘flatten’ into merely self-
interested agents, but retain and even develop other motivations.70 Similarly, Stanley Hauerwas 
argues we observe so few truly virtuous people because human beings usually lack a formative 
experience and guiding narrative which orders their life. On this view, virtues are not abstract, 
but institutionally, communally, and historically bound phenomena.71 If we expect people to 
practice a virtue consistently, they must be shaped by some community that depends on those 
virtues.  
Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s work indicates individuals need skills, local knowledge, and 
social trust to govern themselves. While not usually the subject of analysis, self-governance also 
turns out to be morally strenuous.72 For example, in order for policing to remain cheap enough to 
be feasible in self-governing systems, a high level of compliance is required: many individuals 
choose to comply rather than shirk their duties or steal. Ostrom even mentions that such high 
compliance rates are remarkable.73 Additionally, in self-governing systems, rules are often 
evolutionary. This means that agents must learn to ‘think constitutionally’ even while in-period. 
Elinor Ostrom repeatedly emphasized the need to attend to both the structure of environments 
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and the need for human action, characterizing collective action problems as a ‘drama’ rather than 
a ‘tragedy.’74 
Each of these approaches assumes (a) human beings can change, (b) their institutional 
environment has a large impact on that change, but (c) continued individual choices enable 
becoming and institutional success. Returning to constitutional commitment, the goal is to 
explain how human beings might develop moral restraint and strategic courage. As the case of 
Sen. Tillis indicates, politicians often know what constitutional commitment requires of them, 
but are unable to act upon it because other motivations win out. Prioritizing moral restraint and 
strategic courage makes more sense if we recall their meaning:  
1. Moral Restraint: the ability to do what is right in the absence of enforced rules and in the presence of 
reasons to do otherwise.  
2. Strategic Courage:  the ability to act in accordance with an unenforced rule which transcends in-period 
incentives and itself helps institute a new and better norm.  
 
Both moral restraint and strategic courage are naturally suited to the discussion of making 
institutions work: both have to do with self-interest, rules, compliance, and institutional 
improvement or maintenance. How each of the approaches to institutions and character above fit 
with the formation of moral restraint and strategic courage may be clarified by a hypothetical.  
Religious Community: A particular religious community, RC, depends on the participation of 
members to complete a variety of tasks and operate its ventures. RC’s soup kitchen, weekly 
service, eldercare, childcare, religious outreach, and anti-poverty initiative all depend on 
volunteers from within RC to operate successfully. RC uses the majority of its money to facilitate 
volunteer-based programs, rather than spending money on increased staff. This means RC cannot 
pay staff to oversee member behavior and decisions at every event and program, so substantial 
trust is needed between members and staff.  
 
Additionally, each approach is tailored by participating members to suit the particular aims of the 
population being served. Often, no one knows in advance who will take on a new, strenuous 
volunteer position, and so members must ‘step up’ to the challenge. As such, RC members often 
overcome new collective action problems and form new rules and institutional approaches as a 
result. RC staff and volunteers use stories of self-sacrifice and courage to help members imagine, 
and then practice becoming more virtuous people. Finally, there is a process for serving in 
 
74 Ostrom, Elinor, et. al., eds. 2002. 
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increasingly demanding roles. Sometimes members of RC fail in one way or another. Staff and 
members of RC practice forgiveness, to a point: continual failure to help accomplish RC’s goals or 
other failures disqualify members of RC from further service.75  
 
 Religious Community fits well with each of the above approaches to character formation 
and RC requires a great deal of moral restraint and strategic courage to operate. RC is an entire 
community with ecological niches for altruistic behavior, self-governance, and a coherent 
narrative guiding member experiences toward the success of the community. In Buchanan’s 
terminology, members of RC are often rule bound, though not rule determined, to practice moral 
restraint and strategic courage. RC may use praise, gift cards, status, and any number of other 
incentives to help members live up to their high expectations. These may make compliance 
easier, but do not eliminate the need for moral restraint and strategic courage. 
RC’s environment facilitates artifactual changes to members’ ‘private constitution,’ their 
character. Just as Jones learns to resist smoking, members learn to resist temptations to use the 
discretion they have by morally restraining themselves. Additionally, new rules and approaches 
in RC require strategic courage. For every new initiative, members must be willing to 
courageously overcome the challenging incentives of collective action. Members are immersed 
in an environment with numerous opportunities to practice moral restraint and strategic courage, 
and so become the sort of people who have those virtues. In the context of RC, members realize 
when their actions fall outside the spirit of RC’s goals. Their moral restraint and strategic 
courage are ordered to a lexically prior goal: the success of the organization through adherence 
to established and evolving norms. Within the constraints of that end, there is wide discretion for 
what members choose to pursue. 
 
75 While this seems like an exceptional case, many such organizations exist. See Sherman, Amy L. 2011. 
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 If Buchanan and scholars from political theory, theological ethics, and economics are 
correct about institutions and character, then institutions like RC will produce people capable of 
moral restraint and strategic courage. While RC is hypothetical, many actual religious and 
service oriented organizations, family life, and the military share commonalities with RC: they 
have coherent narratives, shared values, and require moral restraint and strategic courage (or 
simply courage). In these contexts, individuals must develop a sense of when their own self-
interest runs contrary to that of the group. When their own self-interested goals do not conflict 
with the group, they sense it is fine to proceed. When they conflict, they learn to practice moral 
restraint and strategic courage to preserve an already held norm or help establish a new norm. 
 While Public Choice institutions are not conducive to constitutional commitment, there 
are several ways moral restraint and strategic courage may be preserved in office. First, if 
character is stable over time, then entrance into another institution will not undo years of 
formational work. As Christian Miller points out, Situationist critiques of virtue ethics need not 
eliminate the possibility of stable character: it may just be difficult to achieve.76 Because 
constitutional commitment informs how the Principled Politician thinks, feels, and acts, their 
commitment is part of their character. The lexical priority of constitutional commitment allows 
the Principled Politician to remain competitive, so they will be less subject to crowding out: 
within the rules, the Principled Politician can fight hard to keep their seat. This integration allows 
the politician to preserve their commitment even when they act in their self-interest: the daily 
demands of politics need not eliminate one’s commitment.  
Second, one promising strategy for preserving virtue is ‘getting the word out.’ When 
people are reminded that certain situations tend to steer them away from virtuous behavior, they 
 




actually choose the virtuous action more.77 If politicians are made aware of the need for moral 
restraint and strategic courage, they may have a better shot at preserving it. Third, research on 
virtues suggests that inspirational stories, role models, and trendsetters may assist in developing 
and preserving virtue.78 In a rather Romantic turn, this suggests that politicians need heroes. 
Politicians may take inspiration from past politicians, activists, religious leaders, and even 
fictional characters. These role models help motivate and orient the Principled Politician.  
Finally, if the aforementioned approaches to becoming and institutions are correct, then 
the most promising strategy for politicians to retain moral restraint and strategic courage is to 
continue using those abilities in the context of an institution. This may occur both within and 
outside Public Choice institutions. Even in unRomantically designed political institutions, 
politicians may find opportunities to practice their capabilities. In the presence of moral restraint 
and strategic courage, the cases I mention earlier as dilemmas for the politician transform into 
opportunities to do the right thing. It is not as if these opportunities are without political costs--
by definition, they are costly. But, even in highly polarized and competitive environments, doing 
the right thing still gets attention: there may be an ecological niche even in institutions like 
Congress for moral restraint and strategic courage. When Sen. Mitt Romney broke with his own 
party in the impeachment trial of Pres. Donald Trump, he received criticism from within his own 
party, but received praise from others as well.79 Lastly, politicians may preserve moral restraint 
and strategic courage outside Public Choice institutions. By retaining connections and spending 
 
77 Miller, Christian B. 2018, 209-14 
 
78 Bicchieri, Cristina. 2017. Chapter 5 “Trendsetters.” and Miller, Christian B. 2018, 195-204. 
 
79 Millhiser, Ian. 2020.  
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time with formative moral institutions, politicians can continue to value and practice moral 
restraint.  
Section V-B: The Risks of Becoming 
Thus far, I have focused on how differently designed institutions may allow individuals 
to develop moral restraint and strategic courage. However, the above description in Religious 
Community ignores an account of the risks involved in developing moral restraint and strategic 
courage. Public Choice wisely treats love and virtue as scarce resources and so attempts to avoid 
moral and political failures with high social costs. In institutional environments where virtue is 
not treated as a scarce resource, but an intended product of the right working of the organization, 
there will be very real moral and social risks and attendant costs. While some philosophers have 
discussed risk-taking in relation to becoming virtuous, there is little discussion of institutionally 
situated risks and virtues.80 There are, of course, the famous (or infamous) studies in psychology 
which show how human beings can behave worse than normal under certain circumstances and 
discussion of how to avoid certain circumstances if you hope to preserve your status as a virtuous 
person.81  
 However valuable avoiding risk is, there are always unavoidable risks in the development 
of virtue. Take a simple example. I cannot make a promise with the assurance that I will never be 
tempted to break it. Keeping my promise despite temptation is praiseworthy. Of course, I may 
fail. We do not know in advance whether the promise-maker will actually follow through. I see 
no way around the following: if I am to become a trustworthy person, both I and those who are 
party to my promise are at risk.  
 
80 There are notable exceptions. E.g. Stangl, Rebecca. 2015; Tessman, Lisa. 2005. 
 
81 E.g. Zimbardo, P. 2007; Milgram, S. 1963. 
41 
 
Let us assume that theorists of virtue and character are correct about the role of 
institutions and that moral restraint and strategic courage must be practiced in order to be 
learned. Add to this that the course of developing a virtue is often non-linear and subject to many 
failures along the way. A natural implication from these facts is wherever moral restraint and 
strategic courage are developed, there will be risks associated with their development similar to 
those associated with becoming trustworthy. Recall Frieda, our Principled Politician. It is easy to 
wonder just how Frieda developed the skills she has.  
Consider the following examples derived from Religious Community. In each case, 
Frieda, a volunteer at RC, has opportunities to practice moral restraint and strategic courage. As 
a consequence, Frieda exposes herself and others to moral risks and real costs. I focus on the 
capacity of moral restraint.  
Soup Kitchen: Frieda has to decide whether to serve. She could stay home or put in extra hours at 
work, but she decides that it is more important to do something for others than for herself. If 
Frieda doesn’t serve, it slightly increases the likelihood the soup kitchen will fail and many will go 
without food that night. This is a somewhat low risk, and Frieda meets the challenge. However, 
after serving, Frieda is one of the last to leave. Consequently, she has an opportunity to steal some 
of the food from the pantry. Frieda could practice moral restraint or steal. She could do wrongly 
and cost the soup kitchen some of their resources, or come through an enable their success. 
 
Care: Because Frieda has been trustworthy at the soup kitchen, RC staff decide to trust her with 
their eldercare and childcare initiatives. Frieda volunteers some of her time every week going to 
visit and care for the elderly members of the community. She also watches other people’s children 
while they work. If Frieda does not volunteer, the costs are higher, since they are weekly, time-
intensive tasks. Also, she is hard to replace since not everyone has earned RC’s trust. Thankfully, 
Frieda shows up and is trusted to watch and care for children and elderly members of the 
community at different times. Consequently, she is exposed to temptation: minimally, she might 
do a bad job, neglecting the elderly or the children. Worse, she might steal from or abuse the 
elderly and children. Frieda’s behavior is mostly unobserved and even if she is caught after 
committing a wrong, it will not undo the damage she does. Frieda’s practice of moral restraint 
under these conditions is more strenuous than in Soup Kitchen, making the risks and rewards of 
becoming even higher. 
 
Anti-Poverty: Because of Frieda’s good record, she is trusted with leadership on one of RC’s anti-
poverty teams. The teams come up with unique approaches to fight poverty and relieve suffering 
among the homeless in their area. Because RC depends on Frieda and her team for their decision-
making and local knowledge, she is entrusted with a great deal of autonomy and funds from RC’s 
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operating budget. If all goes well, Frieda and her team will practice strategic courage through 
personal sacrifice and overcome team-specific collective action problems. If Frieda develops 
moral restraint well, she will resist the temptation to embezzle money from the operating budget. 
Even if she has to turn in receipts, she can find ways of spending money which benefits her more 
than the goals of the group. Again, RC’s goals depend on Frieda’s moral restraint and strategic 
courage. 
 
Soup Kitchen, Care, and Anti-Poverty illustrate the relationship between the level of risk and the 
level of development involved when practicing moral restraint. In order for these opportunities to 
arise, institutions must be ordered to depend upon moral restraint and strategic courage. For 
Frieda to develop into the sort of person who can be counted on to practice moral restraint under 
pressure, she must practice it under pressure.  
 From an institutional perspective, the trade-off is just as Buchanan and Tullock discuss: 
wherever moral restraint is abundant, less institutional restraint will be needed and vice versa.82 
Where institutional goals and collective action problems overlap with a need for moral restraint 
or strategic courage, institutions rely on people to do the right thing rather than be forced by rules 
to do the right thing.  
It is easy to miss the profundity of this relation. At the individual level, where we attempt 
to practice moral restraint, we risk failure and moral wrongdoing. At the institutional level, when 
individuals attempt moral restraint, they enable cheaper solutions to collective action problems, 
but expose the institution to different moral failure than if behavior was enforced rather than 
voluntary. UnRomantic Public Choice institutions economize on virtue, limiting the dynamic I 
have just described. The risk of Public Choice institutions is that by setting low expectations, 
politicians sink to meet them and fail to put constitutional commitment before self-interest. 
These risks are mirrored in high expectations institutions: by depending on members to exercise 
 
82 Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962, 288 
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moral restraint, personal moral and institutional failure are more likely if agents do not live up to 
high expectations. High expectations institutions serve a purpose, but not without a cost. 
 With this dynamic in mind, the range of social costs and moral risks and rewards expands 
across different organizations. In family, work, religion, service, government, and play, wherever 
we develop and count on character, risk comes as a package deal. When people volunteer for 
military service, they sign up for extreme training in moral restraint and strategic courage. 
Combat situations afford the individual many opportunities to develop these capabilities. 
Obviously, there are extremely high risks as well: the abuse of command, the costs of cowardice, 
and a lack of accountability can result in true atrocities. They can also result in human beings 
capable of incredible personal sacrifice to protect their group. Essentially, anywhere human 
beings have asymmetric power and must exercise it well, there are opportunities to practice 
moral restraint and consequent exposure to the risk of their failure to wield such power well.  
Section V-C: Putting it All Together 
 From this understanding of the risks of becoming, several implications may be drawn. 
First, the location of these risks is significant. Recall the principle I offered earlier which 
encapsulates the distribution of risk across political institutions and civil society: where moral 
failure has low social costs, we can allow ‘high expectations’ in institutional design; where moral 
failure has high social costs, we ought to apply ‘low expectations’ in institutional design. If 
Frieda morally fails in any of the civil society cases above, she does real harm and creates real 
costs for others. However, her failure in RC will have lower social costs than similar failures in 
political institutions, where the abuse of power and failure of institutions have the potential for 
extremely high costs. Most of the time, if Frieda the US Senator fails to put others’ interest 
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before her own, there are few social costs. However, as in crucial moments I describe in section 
III, Frieda must be able to put her constitutional commitment before self-interest.  
RC is a ‘high expectations’ institution. Morally speaking, it asks a lot of its members. 
Frieda’s experience there shows that high expectations afford greater opportunity for developing 
moral restraint, but not without increasing opportunities for costly moral failure. These risks of 
causing extensive social costs are lower than if political institutions treated virtue to be 
something produced, rather than a scarce commodity. Hence, Public Choice rightly operates on 
‘low expectations.’ The character which Frieda develops in the high expectations RC is exactly 
the sort needed in order to solve the Problem of Low Expectations: overcoming self-interest in 
order to preserve a constitutional principle or establish a new, helpful norm. If such risks are 
necessary for the development of moral restraint and strategic courage, then they may be 
justified. 
 Second, in light of the relationship between institutions which help develop moral 
restraint and strategic courage, the liberal concern for a right of ‘exit’ takes on different light. 
First, the discussion above affirms the importance of exit as an alternative to direct interference. 
If developing moral restraint and strategic courage occur in these environments, they ought to be 
preserved. However, since they are conceptually tied to the potential for abuse, members must 
have the freedom to leave. Second, if these institutions become sites for bad behavior, they may 
have the opposite effect, producing increasingly vicious agents who know how to use 
opportunities to wrong others at their discretion. This means that some oversight of these 
institutions is justified. As in sexual abuse scandal of the Catholic Church, abuse of power may 
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become systemic and the opportunities for developing virtue will simply be overrun by bad 
actors.83 In those instances, it makes sense for state actors to interfere. 
 Taking the risks of becoming into account, there are no easy, costless answers. We need 
politicians who can exercise moral restraint and strategic courage. If we lack such politicians, our 
political institutions will lack an agential backstop, making them more vulnerable to decay. 
However, where moral restraint and strategic courage are produced, where institutions depend 
upon those capacities, opportunities for moral failure abound. There may be ways of cleverly 





















Section VI: Conclusion 
 Public Choice claims that no ethical theory of the politician is needed if even self-
interested politicians have a constitutional moment. Because such moments are rare and 
opportunities for decay occur, the Principled Politician fills an important gap: prevent decay and 
promote reform. The fact that institutions play a leading role in the process of becoming implies 
that politicians in Public Choice institutions will have reason to become more like Homo 
economicus, and that other institutions may be designed to develop the character necessary for 
constitutional commitment. However, neither institutional approach overcomes the importance 
of human agency: the politician may practice constitutional commitment and the agent in civil 
society may become wicked despite their environment.  
 For voters, this investigation yields some helpful criteria. Politicians who have a 
formative experience in an institution which requires moral restraint or strategic courage are 
preferable to those who have not had such experiences. Military and community service may be 
good ques for voters. Thankfully, these are already considered good qualities for public office. 
However, the discussion above serves better as a way of disqualifying candidates: if their career 
has been plagued by scandals and lawsuits or if they engage in reforms that undercut 
constitutionally protected rights, voters must look askance at such candidates. Paying attention to 
such failures will help weed out both Zealots and unprincipled politicians. Though each action 
may slightly alter it, character does not form especially quickly. Moral reform is possible, but 
those with suspect records of moral restraint and strategic courage should not be elected to 
offices subject to the Problem of Low Expectations. Such people will likely fail when the crucial 
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moment for exhibiting constitutional commitment arises. Last, politicians with a clean record of 
service provide an indication they successfully preserve constitutional commitment. There may 
even be evidence of this fact in their voting record: seeming errors of self-interest may actually 
be instances of constitutional commitment. 
 There are also implications for political parties. If party discipline is especially strong, 
constitutional commitment becomes even more strenuous. However, if party leadership does not 
exert more control than necessary, it may produce an environment somewhat more friendly to 
the Principled Politician. Further, if party leadership exhibits constitutional commitment, then 
party control may be tempered.  
While not directly the focus of this paper, moral restraint and strategic courage play an 
essential role in the several pressing issues today. Both intergenerational saving and climate 
change share features which make them fairly intractable for in-period politicians who are 
merely self-interested. There are real costs for the politician who takes concerted action on 
climate change and reform on government spending. As our political leaders rightly respond to 
COVID-19, many are granted emergency powers. Ideally, this merely affords them the ability to 
adequately respond to the growing crisis. However, what discretion may be used for good may 
also be used for ill. We need Principled Politicians who are able to correctly use emergency 
powers, rather than using such discretion to feed their self-interested aims under the cover of the 
national interest.  
Finally, further research is required. First, several in-depth case studies may be performed 
to investigate how politicians who resemble the Principled Politician came to possess the 
faculties necessary for constitutional commitment. Close biographical study may reveal in 
greater detail both how people come to resemble the Principled Politician, how they preserve 
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their character in office, and how they may find a path to office. Second, the investigation so far 
has been largely conceptual. There are likely theoretical rewards to a more fine-grained analysis 
of rules: the Principled Politician may be more or less likely under some decision procedures 
than others. For example, eras in electoral politics are characterized by more or less party 
control. A closer look at the prevalence of constitutional commitment under different 
circumstances may provide insight on which arrangements are most conducive to the Principled 
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